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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction to consider and hear this appeal pursuant to the provisions of
Section 3 of Article VIII of the Constitution of Utah, Rule 3
of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Utah Code Ann.
§78-2-2(3) (j) (1988), and Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

The Second Judicial District Court entered

Final Summary Judgment in favor of the third-party defendants,
Bountiful City and Davis County, on October 11, 1988, and
certified the Judgment for appeal.

A notice of appeal was

filed on October 25, 1988.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Was the District Court correct in concluding that

the acts complained of in the First Amended Complaint and the
Amended Third-Party Complaint involved the management of flood
waters and the construction, repair and operation of flood and
storm systems?
2.

Was the District Court correct in classifying the

activities of Bountiful City and Davis County, set forth in
the Amended Third-Party Complaint and established during
discovery, as governmental functions with absolute immunity?
3.

Is Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1986) unconstitution-

al in light of Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution?
4.

Should the negligence and/or fault of Bountiful

City and Davis County be compared by the jury on a special
verdict form, along with the negligence and/or fault, if any,
-1-

of other parties to the litigation.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
1.

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 22.

2.

Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Annotated,

Sections 63-30-3, 8, 9, 10 and 10.5.
3.

Comparative Fault Act, Utah Code Annotated,

Sections 78-27-38, 40 and 41.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case began as a property damage action brought
by the plaintiffs (hereinafter "homeowners") against several
defendants, including the owners and developers of land known
as the Bridlewood Development.

The homeowners1 complaint, in

substance, sought to recover compensation for property damage
resulting from floods which occurred in 1986.

Third-party

plaintiffs brought an action against Bountiful City and Davis
County for contribution, indemnity, and a comparison of fault
by way of a third-party complaint.
Third-party plaintiffs seek review of the Order of
the Second Judicial District Court granting summary judgment
to third-party defendants (Bountiful City and Davis County)
which was entered on October 11, 1988 (Addendum p. 1)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Third-party plaintiffs owned an interest in

(hereinafter "landowners") or were involved in the planning,
development and construction (hereinafter "developers") of
improvements to real property located in Bountiful and known

-2-

as Bridlewood.
2.

On or about October 19, 1987, homeowners filed

an amended complaint wherein they alleged that the landowners
and developers are liable to them for damages.

(R. 40;

Addendum p. 7)
3.

The landowners and developers subsequently filed

an amended third-party complaint against Bountiful City and
Davis County alleging that they are entitled to indemnity,
contribution, and/or comparison of fault of all parties,
including Bountiful City and Davis County, pursuant to current
comparative fault statutes.
4.

The landowners retained the developers to

develop the property.
5.

(R. 414; Addendum p. 16)

(Sandberg Depo. p. 14)

The developers worked closely with Bountiful

City and Davis County to comply with their rules, regulations
and ordinances regarding the development of a residential
subdivision.
6.

(R. 484)
The developers complied with or exceeded all

County and City ordinances while constructing the Bridlewood
Subdivision.
7.

(R. 484)
The developers were required to obtain final

approval of their plans from the Bountiful City Planning and
Zoning Commission, City Council, and City Engineer prior to
beginning actual construction of the project.
8.

(R. 488)

The developers were aware that flood control mea-

sures would be required during the construction process.
-3-

The

developers agreed to abide by the requirements of Bountiful City,
9•

It was represented to the developers by Jack

Balling, Bountiful City Engineer, that he (Balling) would also
require the approval of Davis County before he allowed the
developers to proceed with flood control measures in the
subdivision project.

(Sandberg Depo0 pp. 29, 264; Jenkins

Depo. pp. 100-105) Throughout the entire construction of the
Bridlewood project, Davis County was aware of what was
transpiring.
10.

(Sandberg Depo. p. 32)
The storm drainage system for the Bridlewood

project had to be specifically approved by Davis County.
(Jenkins Depo. p. 100; Sandberg Depo. p. 265)

When the

Bridlewood project was annexed by Bountiful City, it was
agreed that Davis County would look over the plans to ensure
the plans met the County's standards (Jenkins Depo. p. 101)
The County was to review the progress of the storm drainage
system as the project developed.
11.

(Jenkins Depo. p. 101)

Davis County inspectors periodically visited the

Bridlewood job site to inspect the work being done, including
the installation of interim flood control facilities.
(Sandberg Depo. pp. 72-73, 75, 105, 174, 240)
12.

The developers were granted final approval to

proceed with the development of the Bridlewood project on
September 11, 1985.
13.

(Sandberg Depo. p. 49)

The developers planned to, and did in fact,

develop Bridlewood in three separate phases.

-4-

(Balling Depo.

p. 85) However, Bountiful City and Davis County imposed a requirement on the developers that an access road be constructed
in Bridlewood from the top of the subdivision to the bottom
prior to the development of the first phase.

(Balling Depo.

p. 85)
14.

The developers initially intended to construct a

dead-end road in the first phase of Bridlewood and extend the
road into the second and third phases when development of
those phases commenced.

(Balling Depo. p. 90)

However, when

development of Bridlewood actually started, the developers
were required by the City and the County to construct the
access road in its entirety, rather than in phases.
Depo.

pp. 128-129)

(Balling

The purpose of the access road was to

provide access to emergency vehicles, fire, police, and other
service vehicles and personnel.
15.

(Balling Depo.

p. 88)

When the access road was excavated, the property

was necessarily denuded of some vegetation.

(Balling Depo. p.

90)
16.

Construction of the road in Bridlewood required

that deep cuts be made in the terrain, some at a depth of 20
feet.

(Sandberg Depo. p. 52)
17.

Immediately subsequent to making the cuts for the

road in the fall of 1985, the developers planned to install a
storm sewer system and build an on-site detention basin.
(Sandberg Depo. p. 54)

In the plans submitted by the develop-

ers and approved by Bountiful City, the developers proposed

-5-

constructing their own on-site detention basin to accommodate
runoff,

(Sandberg Depo. p. 38; Balling Depo. p. 27; Jenkins

DepOo p. 104-105)
18.

Prior to and at or near this time period, Davis

County was also in the process of deciding whether or not to
build a regional detention basin.

(Sandberg Depo. p. 65)

Davis County had been considering constructing a regional
storm detention basin since 1984 or 1985.

Davis County had

been working with North Salt Lake to bring a major storm
drainage line up 3800 South to a point on the east side of
Main Street or U.S. 89 with the intent of eventually bringing
that facility on east to serve the areas east of Orchard Drive
(the area of the Bridlewood Subdivision). (R. 350-51)
19.

Nevertheless, it was the understanding of the

developers when they received final approval for the Bridlewood
project that the decision to either build their own on-site
detention basin or to participate in a regional detention
basin was entirely within the control of the developers.
(Sandberg Depo. p. 56)
20.

In the minutes of a special meeting of the

Bountiful City Planning Commission, final approval was given
to the Bridlewood project subject to the condition that the
developers "provide storm detention for the runoff in the
Hooper Canyon drainage basin with a release rate of 2 cfs.
This may be provided on the Bridlewood property £r on the site
for South Davis Boulevard through an agreement with Davis
-6-

County Commission . • .." (Deposition Exhibit No, 65)
21.

The developers began the excavation and con-

struction of the Bridlewood project with the clear understanding that they could utilize their own on-site detention
basin if they desired.
22.

(Sandberg Depo. p. 66)

In December of 1985 or January of 1986, the

developers were informed by Jack Balling that, instead of
constructing an on-site detention basin, they would have to
contribute to the regional detention basin, which the County
had decided to build, and that he (Balling) would not allow
the developers to move ahead with the project until appropriate arrangements had been made.
23.

(Sandberg Depo. p. 56)

After Bountiful City imposed the requirement that

developers participate in the regional detention basin, Bountiful
City and Davis County delayed until May of 1986 in reaching an
agreement with the developers.
24.

(Sandberg Depo. p. 66)

The delay of Bountiful City and Davis County with

respect to the regional detention basin was a constant concern
to third-party plaintiffs.

On January 16, 1986, Mark Sandberg,

one of the developers, sent a letter to Davis County Commissioner Tippets outlining his concern that the County would not
have the regional detention basin on line on time.

He stated:

We are now ready to start construction of our
storm drainage system. It is our desire to move
ahead immediately with construction of the storm
retention pond prior to the spring run off.
During earlier discussions with the county, you
have expressed a desire for us not to construct
-7-

our detention pond and participate with you in
construction of a larger detention pond at a
future crossing site at the Hooper Draw by Davis
Blvd. We would still like to participate with
the county on this venture, however, retention
of our spring run-off and moving ahead with our
lot development has become a critical item."
(Emphasis added) (Deposition Exhibit No. 87)
25.

On January 23, 1986, Sid Smith, Davis County

Flood Control Director, informed David Bird (a representative
of the Consortium, the engineering company retained by the
developers) that he (Smith) believed construction could begin
on the regional detention basin within 90 days (i.e.,
approximately March 23, 1986).
26.

(Deposition Exhibit No. 57)

By April, 1986, frustrated by the lengthy delay

and in an effort to speed up the construction of the regional
detention basin, the developers sent Davis County a $28,500
check, which constituted one-half of developers1 monetary
obligation toward the regional detention basin.

This money

was sent even before an "official" agreement was reached on
May 12, 1986, regarding construction of the regional detention
basin.

(Jenkins Depo. p. 145; Deposition Exhibit 106)
27.

On May 12, 1986, one of the landowners executed

a contract with Davis County which obligated Davis County to
put the regional detention basin on line within eight months
(i.e., approximately December of 1986).

(Sandberg Depo. p.

7 3; Deposition Exhibit No. 67)
28.
completed.

The regional detention basin was not timely
It did not begin to offer any protection from

flood waters until late April of 1987 and was not fully com-8-

pleted until early October of 1987.
29.

(Smith Depo. p. 37)

The controversy concerning the location of the

regional detention basin site delayed the Bridlewood project
approximately six months.

If the developers had been allowed

to utilize an on-site detention basin as originally designed
and approved, a fully operational storm sewer system would have
been in operation at the time of the major summer storms which
caused damage alleged by plaintiffs.
30.

(Sandberg Depo. p. 10 3)

The developers attempted to remedy the failure

of the County to have the regional detention basin in place by
installing temporary flood control measures.

These temporary

flood control devices were approved by, and in some cases
directed by, Bountiful City.
154)

(Sandberg Depo. pp. 57, 58,

The temporary measures were better than what was sug-

gested or expected by Bountiful City.

(Balling Depo. p. 75)

Davis County characterized the interim flood control measures
as "state of the art."
31.

Heavy

lf

(Smith Depo. pp. 98, 99)

100-year storms" occurred on July 23 and

August 20, 1986, which combined with the conditions then
existing on the Bridlewood Subdivision caused the plaintiffs
to sustain the damages for which they seek recovery in this
lawsuit.

(R. 40)
32.

When the rainstorms did occur, neither Bountiful

City nor Davis County undertook to manage the "flood waters"
generated from the rainfall in the Bridlewood development area.

-9-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed
for several fundamental reasons, any one of which standing
alone is sufficient to merit reversal•
A.

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1986) is Inapplicable to This Case.
The activities of Bountiful City and Davis County

which are at issue in this action do not involve decisions
relating to the management of flood waters or the construction,
repair, and operation of flood and storm systems.

The acts

complained of involve unwarranted delays in decision making,
as well as improper requirements imposed on those involved
with the development and construction of the Bridlewood Project.
Bountiful City and Davis County are attempting to
escape liability by arguing that their actions involved the
construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems.
This argument is made by focusing on the result of the negligent acts (or inaction) rather than the acts themselves.

The

activities of Bountiful City and Davis County primarily
involve delay in making a decision regarding the regional
detention basin, requiring the developers to participate in a
regional detention basin, and foreclosing the option of
constructing their own on-site detention basin, as well as
negligent decision making in requiring the roadway to be cut
in one phase, rather than three phases.

Davis County and

Bountiful City were not involved in managing the flood waters
even after the tremendous 100-year storms.
-10-

Further, Davis

County and Bountiful City did not construct, repair, or operate
a flood or storm system on the Bridlewood Project.

That their

negligent acts resulted in a flood should not operate to place
them within the confines of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
B.

Bountiful City's and Davis County's Activities Do Not
Constitute Governmental Functions. Even if the Acts of
Davis County and Bountiful City Are Found to be
Governmental Functions, Such a Conclusion Results Merely
in the Granting of Qualified Immunity.
Because Bountiful City's and Davis County's activi-

ties are not acts involving the management of flood waters or
the construction, repair or operation of flood or storm
systems, such activities are not statutorily accorded
"governmental function" status.

Since the activities do not

involve governmental functions, the qualified immunity
bestowed by the Governmental Immunity Act is inapplicable.
The acts of Bountiful City and Davis County do not
constitute a governmental functions under Utah case law.
"[T]he test for determining governmental immunity is whether
the activity under consideration is of such a unique nature
that it can only be performed by a governmental agency or that
it is essential to the core of governmental activity."
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1236-37
(Utah 1980).

(The expanded statutory definition of governmen-

tal function did not become effective until 1987 and therefore
is inapplicable to this action.)

Bountiful City's and Davis

County's actions in requiring the road to be cut in one phase
instead of three distinct phases, the requirement that the
-11-

developers participate in a regional detention basin as opposed
to constructing their own on-site facilities, and the delay in
getting the regional detention basin operational, clearly do
not satisfy the "governmental function" test.

Because Bountiful

City's and Davis County's actions cannot be classified as
governmental functions, they therefore enjoy no immunity for
those actions.
Even if this Court concludes that Bountiful City's
and Davis County's activities do satisfy the case law or statutory definition of governmental function, the existence of
governmental immunity is not established.

The Utah Governmental

Immunity Act grants only qualified immunity to governmental
entities involved in governmental functions subject to the
express waivers of immunity contained in Utah Code Ann.
§§63-30-8 through 10.5.
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-8 (1986), covering injuries
caused by defective or dangerous roadways, applies to
Bountiful City's and Davis County's requirement that the
access road be built in one phase.

Utah Code Ann. §6 3-30-9

(1986) provides for the waiver of immunity for injuries caused
by the dangerous or defective condition of any public improvement.
issue.

This provision is also applicable to the access road
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10 (1986) covers the waiver of

immunity for negligent acts committed by employees of
governmental entities.

This waiver pertains to the improper

and unwarranted requirements imposed upon the third-party
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plaintiffs by the City and County.

Finally, Utah Code Ann.

§63-30-10.5 (Supp. 1988) provides for the waiver of immunity
when a governmental entity takes or damages private property
without just compensation.
C.

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1986) is Unconstitutional.
Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution pro-

vides that "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation.11

It is apparent that

the manner in which Utah Code Ann. §6 3-30-3 (1986) is being
applied at the trial level is inconsistent and in contravention of this constitutional mandate.

In this case, §63-30-3

is being applied so as to take or damage private property
without just compensation.
D.

The Fault of Davis County and Bountiful City Must Be
Compared.
A final important point raised on appeal is the

apportionment of liability, even if Bountiful City and Davis
County are eventually found to be immune.
The Utah Comparative Fault Act states that no defendant is liable to a person seeking recovery for any amount
greater than the proportion of fault attributable to that defendant.

This in effect abolishes the concept of joint and several

liability in Utah.

If Bountiful City's and Davis County's

negligence is not allowed to be weighed and apportioned by the
jury, it is highly likely that the third-party plaintiffs will
be assessed a damage award that is much greater than the proportion of fault actually attributable to them.
-13-

This result

is in conflict with the statutory purpose.

Releasing Bountiful

City and Davis County from all liability, and not allowing the
jury to apportion their negligence, will in effect subject
third-party plaintiffs to joint and several liability.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY BOUNTIFUL CITY AND
DAVIS COUNTY IN RELATION TO THE BRIDLEWOOD
PROJECT DID NOT INVOLVE THE MANAGEMENT OF
FLOOD WATERS OR THE CONSTRUCTION, REPAIR,
AND OPERATION OF FLOOD AND STORM SYSTEMS.
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act §6 3-30-3 (1986)
states in pertinent part:
The management of flood waters and other
natural disasters and the construction,
repair, and operation of flood and storm
systems by governmental entities are
considered to be governmental functions, and
governmental entities and their officers and
employees are immune from suit for any injury
or damage resulting from those activities.
The immunity granted by this section applies to governmental
entities in only two specific situations: (1) the management
of flood waters and other natural disasters, and (2) the
construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm
systems.

Bountiful City and Davis County assert that their

actions concerning the Bridlewood development are specifically
granted immunity by this statute.

Such reliance is misplaced.

Before analyzing the two distinct activities granted
governmental function status by the act, it is useful to discuss the two main areas in which the third-party plaintiffs'
claim can be divided.

First, Bountiful City and Davis County
-14-

imposed a requirement that an access road be constructed in a
single phase, rather than in the three phases as had been initially planned.

Second, the County and City delayed in

getting the regional detention basin on line, and foreclosed
the developers1 option to construct their own on-site
detention facilities.
A.

Roadway
As a condition to allowing construction to proceed on

the Bridlewood Project, Davis County and Bountiful City required
the developers to construct an access road from top to bottom
of the Bridlewood Project.

The developers initially intended

to construct the road in three phases, but the City and County
forced the developers to construct the entire road at once.
Despite the concerns voiced by the developers,
particularly Mark Sandberg, a large cut was required to be
made through the entire length of the Bridlewood Project.

In

constructing the roadway, a significant amount of vegetation
had to be stripped from the area.
The unfinished road operated as an artificial
stream bed for runoff water which increased the amount and
speed of runoff flowing through the Bridlewood Project.
Additionally, the denuding of vegetation in constructing the
road contributed to the problem.
If the developers had been allowed to construct the
road in three separate phases, the amount of runoff flowing
through the Bridlewood Project would have been significantly
-15-

decreased.

First, the amount of vegetation required to be

removed would have been reduced.

In other words, vegetation

would have been removed in three phases.

Second, constructing

the actual roadway in three phases would have drastically
reduced the amount of water flowing through the project.

By

constructing only one section of the road at a time, and having the section terminate in a dead end, a natural impediment
to the flow of runoff would have been created.

This would

dramatically reduce the damages sustained by the plaintiffs.
B.

Delay
This case involves a situation in which a developer

was led to believe that it could construct an on-site detention facility to safeguard its project and nearby homeowners
from the danger of runoff flooding.

After initially agreeing

with the choice by the developers to build an on-site detention basin, Davis County delayed and delayed, both in its
decision as to what to do and how to do it.

Finally, after

the Bridlewood Project had been given approval and was already
under construction, the County finally decided that it wanted
a regional detention basin.

Bountiful City then forced the

developers to modify their plans concerning the on-site detention basin, tie in to the regional basin, and contribute to
the cost of the regional detention basin to be constructed by
the County.

After obtaining the agreement of the developers

to participtate in the regional detention basin, the City and
County then failed to move ahead with the actual construction
-16-

of the regional detention basin.

Sid Smith represented to

David Bird of the Consortium that construction would start on
the regional detention basin by March of 1986.

In fact, no

work at all was done on the basin and the County did not draw
up a final agreement until May of 1986.
The foregoing delays by the County resulted in a sixmonth delay of the Bridlewood Project.

If the developer had

been allowed to proceed with the initially agreed upon on-site
detention basin, the necessary permanent flood control measures would have been in place in time to substantially reduce
the damage resulting from the July and August, 1986 storms.
C.

Management of Flood Waters.
A distinction must be made between "management of

flood waters" and claims involving water damage.

Only if a

governmental entity can establish that it was involved in the
actual "management of flood waters" and that damage was caused
as a result of such management, does the immunity accorded by
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1986) apply.
In this case, homeowners assert that flooding did
occur and that their damage was caused by such flooding.
However, there is no claim made in any pleading suggesting
that either Bountiful City or Davis County acted negligently
in the "management" of the flood waters created by the
tremendous "100-year" rainfalls.

None of the activities

performed by Davis County and Bountiful City involved the
"management of flood waters" as anticipated by the statute.
-17-

If a governmental entity is involved in the actual
management of flood waters (such as occurred in Salt Lake City
during the 198 3 spring runoff periods, resulting in massive
flooding down State Street in Salt Lake City, with resulting
loss to business entities in the area, property damage to many
homeowners, etc.) such activities would most likely fall within
the purview of the statute.

The governmental entity is faced

with a natural disaster which needs to be dealt with in a timely
and effective manner without concern over potential lawsuits for
each difficult decision to be made.

The situation is similar

to a governmental entity dealing with a raging fire which is
spreading rapidly to other buildings.

The governmental agency

may determine to destroy a building "in harms way" to prevent
further spread of the fire.

Such a decision must be made with-

out concern for potential lawsuits resulting from the decision.
Here, if Bountiful City and Davis County were on the
property site during the flooding, and decided to dig ditches,
for example, across the landowner's property to prevent further
damage, such acts would appear to fall within the purview of
the Governmental Immunity Act since the activities would be in
furtherance of the legislative mandated duty to "manage flood
waters."
But the decision to require construction of the
roadway in one phase rather than in three separate phases and
the requirement that the third-party plaintiffs "tie into" a
regional detention basin, as opposed to constructing their own
-18-

on-site facilities, and the corresponding delay in completing
the regional detention basin cannot be classified as decisions
involving the "management of flood waters."
Neither Bountiful City nor Davis County were on the
property sites during the flooding, and neither entity took
steps to manage the flood waters.

In fact, their only

involvement at that point was to call the developers.

They do

not, therefore, fall within the purview of the "management of
flood waters" portion of the statute.
D.

Construction, Repair and Operation of a Flood
and Storm System.
Utah Code Annotated §6 3-30-3 (1986) also grants

governmental entities qualified immunity for acts involving
the construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm
systems.

Bountiful City and Davis County did not and were not

involved in the construction, repair, or operation of flood
and storm systems on the Bridlewood project.
It may be helpful to analyze one of the District
Court cases cited by Bountiful City in support of its motion
for summary judgment to determine what is meant by "the
construction, repair and operation of flood and storm systems."
In Larsen v. Brigham City, First Judicial District, Civil No.
18979, January 31, 1986, an action was brought by a landowner
for injuries allegedly sustained because of defendant city's
negligence in constructing earthen dams and drainage ditches
surrounding the Mantua Reservoir.

The plaintiff asserted that

these structures forced water onto his land.
-19-

The court held

the city to be immune in these circumstances.

This case falls

squarely within the realm of constructing, repairing, or operating flood and storm control systems.

(R. 188-9)

In contrast, Bountiful City and Davis County did not
actually physically construct, repair or operate a flood or
storm system on the Bridlewood project.

In the court below,

Bountiful City purported to define the access road as part of
the flood and storm system devised by Bountiful City and Davis
County, thus asserting that the decision to require the construction of the road was encompassed within the grant of
immunity.

Also in the court below, Bountiful City argued that

"one of the purposes of said streets and the purposes of the
curbs, gutters, inlet boxes, storm drain lines and storm detention basins are for the collection and management of storm
waters."

(R. 136)

These arguments are misplaced and stretch

the applicability of the statute to an untenable extent.
The legislature when enacting the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act surely did not intend to confer immunity on a
government entity if it merely showed that "one of the purposes"
or a peripheral result of a particular act or decision impacted
in some slight manner upon anything having to do with a flood.
The roadway was not required to be constructed in one section
to convey storm waters because there was no designated place
to convey the water to.

The regional detention basin was not

even remotely near existence when the road was cut.

Bountiful

City should not be heard to argue that the decision to con-20-

struct the roadway in one section falls within the ambit of
the phrase "construction, repair, and operation of flood and
storm systems" contained in Utah Code Ann, §63-30-3 (1986)•
The City and County are trying to define their conduct by focusing on the result of the conduct, rather than the
conduct itself.

The fact that their inappropriate and negli-

gent action in requiring the road to be constructed in one phase
resulted in a flood, cannot be construed to render the decision
to require construction in one phase a flood control decision.
Additionally, the requirement imposed by the City and
the County on the developers obligating them to tie into a
regional detention basin, rather than proceed with their own
on-site facilities, and then delaying in getting the regional
detention system on line, cannot be construed as being
encompassed within the qualified immunity granted to
governmental entities involved in the construction, repair
and operation of flood and storm systems.
The terms "construction," "repair" and "operation"
all denote an activity actually undertaken by a governmental
entity.

The requirement that the developers participate in a

regional detention basin can hardly be termed a construction
of a storm/flood system or a repair of a storm/flood system or
even the operation of a storm/flood system.

This phrase was

intended to shield the governmental entity from activities
actually undertaken, not for requirements imposed upon others.
If Bountiful City and Davis County are held to be
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immune for the consequences of a decision that they required
the developers to carry out, then equity demands that the
third-party plaintiffs also enjoy comparable immunity.

The

City and County should not be allowed to impose a requirement
on a private party and then escape the consequences for the
imposition of that requirement through immunity while the
private party is held liable to injured third parties for
damages.

Either they both should be held immune, or both

should not be accorded immunity.
Further, if this Court applies the governmental immunity provisions to this type of conduct, this Court would
encourage inaction rather than action in the management of
flood waters.

The City and County "talked about" flood con-

trol measures, but took no action to control flooding until
after the damage to plaintiffs' residences.
In Sioux Falls Constr. Co. v. City of Sioux Falls,
297 N.W. 2d 454 (S.D. 1980), the South Dakota Supreme Court
was faced with determining whether certain conduct engaged in
by a governmental entity was entitled to the benefit of governmental immunity under the guise of flood control.

South Dakota

did not have a statutorily enacted governmental immunity act,
but it adhered to the common law governmental immunity doctrine.
Sioux Falls Constr. involved an action brought by a
contractor who had been engaged by Sioux City to build a
bridge over a diversion channel.

After a storm, the city

failed to open flood gates above the area of construction,
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which resulted in a substantial amount of the contractor's
equipment being washed away.

The contractor alleged negli-

gence and breach of contract as the basis of the cityfs
liability.

The city countered by claiming that because the

channels and flood gates were part of a "flood control
system", the governmental immunity doctrine applied and the
city was therefore immune from suit.

In response to the

governmental immunity argument, the court stated:
We agree to the extent that a city is protected
by governmental immunity from injuries arising
while it is engaged in the task of controlling
flood waters. In this case, however, there is
nothing in the record that would support a
determination by the trial court that the runoff
could be denominated a flood. In fact, the
trial court made no specific determination as
to the character of the water. That is to say,
the mere fact that the channel is part of a
flood control system does not automatically
render all water going through it flood water.
We would distinguish between the rampaging
waters of a river at or near flood stage and
the ordinary flow of water from runoff. The
record discloses that the height of the flow
in the channel rose only some 4-5 feet. In
dealing with flood waters, city officials are
making a judicious decision on how best to minimize the possible damages. In that function they
are entitled to immunity. Viewing, as we must,
the evidence most favorably to the non-moving
party, we find nothing in the fact situation
that would bring the case within that framework.
We therefore reverse the entry of summary
judgment in favor of the city. _Id. at 457.
The Sioux Falls Constr. case serves to illustrate the
fact that the result of conduct should not necessarily operate
to define the conduct.

Bountiful City and Davis County did

not construct, repair or operate the temporary flood control
devices employed by the developers at the Bridlewood Project.
-23-

Requirements were imposed on the developers (which were
followed) but neither the City nor the County constructed,
repaired or operated the flood control measures.

The fact

that flood damage occurred does not insulate the City or the
County from liability.
E.

Summary
It is not possible to construe the City and County's

inactivities and activities as falling within the scope of
flood control activities immunized by Utah Code Ann. §6 3-30-3
(1986).

The City and County are attempting to rely on the

statute by focusing on the result of the wrongful act, rather
than on the act itself.

The City and County characterize

their activities as involving flood control decisions.
However, it would be extremely illogical and wrong to allow
the result of negligent conduct to define the conduct itself.
In the present case, it is obvious that if the driver
of a Bountiful City or Davis County vehicle negligently drove
the vehicle so as to strike and break an exposed water main
which then allowed water to flood homes of Davis County
residents, then neither the City nor the County could claim
that the actions of the employee were shielded by immunity.
This is so because one needs to focus on the cause of the
problem (negligent driving) and not the result of the problem
(flooding).

In this case, the result of the negligence of

Bountiful City and Davis County may be characterized as
flooding, but the cause was the commission by the City and
-24-

County of negligent acts and unwarranted delay for which they
are entitled to no immunity.
POINT II.

A.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CLASSIFYING THE
ACTIVITIES OF BOUNTIFUL CITY AND DAVIS COUNTY
AS GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS WITH ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY.
The Actions Taken By Bountiful City and Davis County Do Not
Constitute Governmental Functions and the Governmental
Entities Are Therefore Not Entitled to Immunity.
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act specifically

grants governmental entities immunity from suit for any injury
resulting from the exercise of a governmental function.

The

Utah court in Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d
1230, 1236-37 (Utah 1980), set forth the reasoning to be utilized in determining whether the act in question involves the
exercise of governmental function.
[T]he test for determining governmental immunity
is whether the activity under consideration is of
such a unique nature that it can only be performed
by a governmental agency or that it is essential
to the core of governmental activity.
This reasoning was confirmed and clarified in a later Utah
Supreme Court case which stated:
The first part of the Standiford test—activity
of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a governmental agency—does not refer
to what a government may do, but to what government alone must do. . . . [T]he second part of
the Standiford test—"essential to the core of
governmental activity"— . . . refers to those
activities not unique in themselves (and thus not
qualifying under the first part) but [to those
activities] essential to the performance of those
activities that are uniquely governmental.
Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 775
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(Utah 1987) (quoting Johnson v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 629 P.2d 432 (Utah 1981)).
The activities of Bountiful City and Davis County
which are

at issue, i.e., the requirement that the roadway

be constructed in one phase rather than in three phases, and
the requirement that the developers participate in the
regional detention basin instead of constructing their own
on-site detention basin, as well as the unwarranted delay in
getting the regional detention basin on line, clearly do not
constitute governmental functions.
In respect to the decision to require the roadway to
be constructed in one phase, it is clear that such activity
does not satisfy the first tier of the Standiford test.
Because the developers cut the roadway themselves, it is clear
that this activity is not of such a unique nature that it can
only be performed by a governmental agency.

Secondly, the

requirement that the roadway be constructed in one phase
rather than three phases surely cannot be classified as being
essential to the core of governmental activity.
The decision requiring the developers to participate
in a regional detention basin, as opposed to constructing
their own on-site detention basin, and the unwarranted delay
in getting the regional basin on line, similarly cannot be
classified as constituting a governmental function.

The con-

struction of a detention basin is not uniquely governmental as
evidenced by the fact that the developers wished to, and were
initially led to believe, that they could construct their own
-26-

on-site detention basin.
At the trial level, the City and the County argued
that this definition of governmental function is not applicable in light of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-2(4)(a) (Supp. 1988),
which has been amended to provide:
"Governmental function" means any act, failure
to act, operation, function, or undertaking of a
governmental entity whether or not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking
is characterized as governmental, proprietary, a
core governmental function, unique to government,
undertaken in dual capacity, essential to or not
essential to a government or governmental function,
or could be performed by private enterprise or
private persons.
This new definition of governmental function is not
relevant to the instant case.
tive until 1987.
occurred in 1986.

This provision was not effec-

The activities at issue in this case
The only way in which this definition would

apply is if the legislature had specifically provided that such
definition would have retroactive effect, which it failed to do.
In Stephens v. Henderson, 741 P.2d 952 (Utah 1987),
the Utah Supreme Court held that the Liability Reform Act
adopted in 1986 would not have retroactive application.

The

court stated:
The starting point for our analysis is Utah
Code Ann. §68-3-3, which provides: "No part
of these revised statutes is retroactive,
unless expressly so declared." The application
of a statute is retroactive if it alters the
substantive law on which the parties relied.
[Citations omitted] Law is substantive
if it "creates, defines and regulates the
rights and duties of the parties and . . . may

-27-

give rise to a cause of action, as distinguished
from adjective law which pertains to and
prescribes the practice and procedure or the
legal machinery by which the substantive law
is determined or made effective. 1(3, at 953-4.
In the instant case, the definition of governmental
function is without doubt a substantive law.

The new defini-

tion obviously expands the definition of governmental function
to include activities which prior case law had excluded.

When

the cause of action in this case arose, the case law definition of governmental function was applicable.

To now require

the application of the new definition would work a substantial
change in the relationship between the respective parties.

A

party who under prior law would not be entitled to immunity
could now conceivably benefit from the grant of immunity.
Such a result is clearly substantive, therefore this statutory
definition cannot be retroactively applied.
B.

Even if it is Determined That the Activities of Bountiful
City and Davis County Constitute Governmental Functions
Under Case Law, the Statutory Waivers of Immunity Remain
Applicable.
Assuming, arguendo, that Bountiful City's and Davis

County's activities are found to constitute actions that are
uniquely governmental or essential to the core of governmental
activity, the existence of governmental immunity is not
conclusively established.

Such a conclusion results merely in

the classification of the activities as governmental functions
subject to the express waivers of immunity contained in Utah
Code Ann.

§§63-30-8 through 10.5.
Except as may otherwise be provided in this
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chapter, all governmental entities are immune
from suit for any injury which results from the
exercise of a governmental function . . . Utah
Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1986).
1.

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-8 (1986)
Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for any injury caused
by defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition
of any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge,
viaduct or other structure located thereon.

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-8 (1986) provides for waiver of
immunity for injury caused by the defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of roads, streets, and highways.

As a condi-

tion to allowing construction to proceed on the Bridlewood
Project, Davis County and Bountiful City required the developers to construct an access road from the top to the bottom of
the Bridlewood Project.

As mentioned above, the developers

initially intended to construct the road in three phases, but
the City and County forced them to construct the entire road
at once.

This decision, imposed on the developers, created a

hazardous and dangerous condition on the road, which resulted
in the damage sustained by plaintiff-homeowners.
2.

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-9 (1986)
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived for any injury caused from a dangerous
or defective condition of any public building,
structure, dam, reservoir or other public improvement. Immunity is not waived for latent defective conditions.

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-9 (1986) provides for waiver of
immunity for injury from dangerous or defective public
improvement.

In the instant case, the dangerous or defective
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condition on the Bridlewood Project consisted of the deep cuts
and denuding of vegetation required for the construction of
the road.

As more fully explained in the proceeding section,

the actions of Bountiful City and Davis County in requiring
that the road be constructed in a particular manner
substantially enhanced the damage to abutting landowners.
3.

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10 (198*6)
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of
an employee committed within the scope of
employment . . .

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10 (1986) provides for waiver
of immunity for injury caused by a negligent act or omission
of an employee.

Clearly, there is a genuine issue of material

fact as to whether the representatives of Bountiful City and
Davis County were negligent when they delayed development of
Bridlewood, required construction of the access road over its
entire length, and forced the developers to forego the
development of their own on-site detention basin and participate in a regional basin which was not timely built.
4.

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10.5 (Supp. 1988)

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10.5 (Supp. 1988) provides for
the waiver of immunity for taking or damaging private property
without compensation.

The provision provides in pertinent part:

(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for the recovery of compensation from the governmental entity when the
governmental entity has taken or damaged private
property without just compensation.
-30-

In the instant case, the actions of Bountiful City
and Davis County resulted in damage to the property of the
plaintiffs.

This section succinctly establishes liability for

damages occasioned by the City and County's unreasonable delay
and negligent instructions and requirements in regard to the
Bridlewood Project.

Because the City and County are

responsible for at least a percentage of the damage incurred
by the plaintiffs, the appellants are entitled to join them as
parties pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-27-41 (1987).
C.

If the Court Concludes That Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3
Applies, the Immunity Granted by That Provision is Not
Absolute and the Waivers of Immunity Are Still
Applicable.
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 initially states:
Except as may be otherwise provided in this
chapter, all governmental entities are immune
from suit for any injury which results from
the exercise of a governmental function . . .

The second paragraph proceeds to specify that:
The management of flood waters and other
natural disasters and the construction, repair,
and operation of flood and storm systems by
governmental entities are considered to be
governmental functions, and governmental entities and their officers and employees are immune
from suit for any injury or damage resulting
from those activities. (Emphasis added)
Assuming, arguendo, that the activities of Bountiful
City and Davis County are encompassed within the second paragraph of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1986), that conclusion
merely results in defining the activity as a governmental
function which is not synonymous with absolute, unqualified
immunity.

The classification of an operation of a governmen-31-

tal entity as a governmental function does not signal unconditional immunity under this section since the grant of immunity
is expressly subject to the operation of other sections of
the Act.

Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah 1980).
It is incongruous to accept Bountiful City's and

Davis County's argument for a potentially boundless construction of the phrases "management of flood waters" and
"construction, repair and operation of flood and storm
systems" and also accept the City's and County's arguments
that this immunity is absolute and not subject to the waiver
provisions of the act.

If absolute immunity was intended, the

Legislature would have termed it absolute immunity rather than
a governmental function which in the preceding paragraph they
had defined as being subject to certain enumerated waivers.
Therefore, it does not make any difference if the status of
governmental function is reached pursuant to the application
of case law, or through activity defined as the "management of
the flood waters" or the "construction, repair, and operation
of flood and storm systems."

If the activity is determined to

be a governmental function, then it is subject to the waivers
of immunity discussed previously.

Several waiver provisions,

as noted in the prior section, are relevant in this action.
D.

Summary
Several alternative theories are set forth in Point

II, any one of which precludes the conclusion that Bountiful
City and Davis County are immune from liability in this
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action.

First, because the activities of the City and County

do not constitute the "management of flood waters" or "the
construction, repair and operation of flood and storm
systems)", such activities must be analyzed pursuant to case
law to determine whether the activities qualify as
governmental functions.

The definition of governmental

function is "whether the activity under consideration is of
such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a
governmental agency or that it is essential to the core of
governmental activity."

The activities of the City and

County, which are the subject of the third-party complaint,
do not fall within such a definition.
Second, even if the activities of Bountiful City and
Davis County are accorded governmental function status under
case law, the express waivers of immunity in the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act operate to negate Bountiful City's
and Davis County's defense of governmental immunity.
Third, if the Court concludes that the activities of
Bountiful City and Davis County do fall within the scope of
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1986), that conclusion merely results
in the classification of such activities as governmental functions subject to the express waivers of immunity contained in
the Governmental Immunity Act.
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POINT III.
UTAH CODE ANN. §63-30-3 (1986) IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN LIGHT OF ARTICLE I,
SECTION 22 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Article I, Section 22, of the Utah State Constitution
states that:
Private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation.
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 Immunity of Governmental
Entities From Suit is in derogation of that constitutional
provision.

This statute provides in pertinent part:
The management of flood waters and other
natural disasters and the construction,
repair, and operation of flood and storm
systems by governmental entities are considered to be governmental functions, and
governmental entities and their officers and
employees are immune from suit for any injury
or damage resulting from those activities.

From the face of the statutory provision, it is apparent that
the immunity given to governmental entities may be used to
shield governmental agencies from liability for compensation
in situations squarely within the purview of Article I,
Section 22.

For example, if a governmental entity damaged the

property of a private landowner in the course of constructing
a storm drainage system, under the District Court's view of
Utah Code Ann.

§63-30-3 (1986), the government could

conceivably assert that it is immune from liability.

This is

the type of uncompensated damage to private property
occasioned by a governmental entity in pursuit of a public use
that Article I, Section 22 was designed to protect against.
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In this case, the actions of Bountiful City and Davis
County caused damage to homeowners' property•

The City and

County assert that their actions in relation to the Bridlewood
Project concerned the management of flood waters and that they
are immune from suit for any injury or damage resulting from
those activities.

Section 6 3-30-3 defines the management of

flood waters as a governmental function.

The very essence of

the definition of a governmental function is an action taken
for the benefit of the public.

Thus, any property taken or

damaged as a result of the exercise of a governmental function
is property taken for a public use.
Whether or not Article I, Section 22 establishes a
cause of action has been analyzed by the Utah Supreme Court in
the past.

The main focus of these opinions is whether the

state has waived its immunity to suit for actions instituted
pursuant to Article I, Section 22.

There are Utah cases which

stand for the proposition that sovereign immunity protects
governmental entities from suits brought for the purpose of
obtaining compensation for the taking or damaging of private
property for public use because Article I, Section 22 of the
Utah Constitution is not self-executing so as to constitute a
waiver of that immunity.

Springville Banking Co. v. Burton,

10 Utah 2d 100, 349 P.2d 157 (1960); Fairclough v. Salt Lake
County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 354 P.2d 105 (1960); and State Road
Comm'n v. Parker, 13 Utah 2d 65, 368 P.2d 585 (1962).
However, these cases are not well reasoned and have been
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sharply criticized.

See for example Justice Wade's stinging

dissent in Fairclough and Judge Thomas Greene's decision in
Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., 634 F.Supp. 100 (D. Utah 1986).
Other cases decided by this Court which have never
been distinguished or overruled are persuasive.

In State-by-

State Road Comm'n v. District Court, Fourth Judicial District,
94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502 (1937), this Court recognized that
rights guaranteed by the Constitution may be enforced by its
citizens.

In discussing the application of Article I, Section

22, this Court stated:
We think it is clear that the framers of the
Constitution did not intend to give the
rights granted by section 22, and then leave
the citizen powerless to enforce such rights.
We hold that this is so whether the injury
complained of by the plaintiffs in the injunction suit is considered a "taking" of property,
or a "damaging" of property. The framers of
the fundamental law, after much debate and
careful consideration of the hardship of the
old rule which allowed compensation only in
the case of a taking of property, wrote into
the Constitution a provision by which we think
they intended to guarantee to the landowner
whose property is damaged just compensation
with the same certainty as to the landowner
whose property is physically taken. 7 8 P.2d
at 508. [Emphasis added]
See also, Gray v. Salt Lake City, 44 Utah 204, 138 P.
1177 (1914) (cited with approval by the Federal District Court
of Utah in Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., supra; Webber v.
Salt Lake City, 40 Utah 221, 120 P. 503 (1911).

Gray and

Webber stand for exactly the same proposition as does Stateby-State Road Commission, namely that the rights guaranteed by
the state Constitution ought to be enforceable by state citizens.
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In 1986, Judge Thomas Greene decided Katsos v. Salt
Lake City Corp., supra.

He held that actions for inverse con-

demnation are recognized and cognizable without enabling
legislation.

He held that Article I, Section 22 of the Utah

Constitution .Ls self-executing.

In so holding, Judge Greene

distinguished Fairclough and cited Gray with approval.

Judge

Greene stated:
Defendants1 primary reliance [on Fairclough]
appears to be on the statement by the Utah
Supreme Court that the Utah Constitution
[Article I, Section 22] is not "self-executing,"
but it is evident from the case that the court
was most concerned with the fact that the state
had not given its consent to be sued. The
statute which arguably waives sovereign immunity
was enacted after Fairclough. Moreover, it is
apparent that actions for inverse condemnation
are recognized and cognizable in the State of
Utah without enabling legislation. See Gray
v. Salt Lake City, 44 Utah 204, 138 Pac. 1177
(1914). Defendants1 motion for summary
judgment as to this claim is denied.
Clearly, it would not be consistent with a constitutional form of government to embody basic rights within the
framework of the Constitution, but to hold that these rights
were ineffectual unless the Legislature enacts legislation
specifically recognizing those rights.
Because the Utah Constitution is the supreme law of
the state of Utah, the Legislature has no power or authority
to enact laws contrary to or at odds with the Constitution.
If §6 3-30-3 is read to provide immunity to Davis County and
Bountiful City in this case, 63-30-3 is in direct conflict
with Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution.
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Accordingly, 6 3-30-3 should be declared unconstitutional.
Also, it appears that the Utah legislature has recognized the apparent conflict between Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3
(1986) and Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution and
specifically enacted Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10.5 (Supp. 1988)
to remedy the situation.

Section 6 3-30-10.5 entitled Wavier

of Immunity For Taking Private Property Without Compensation,
states:
(1)

Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for the recovery of
compensation from the governmental entity
when the governmental entity has taken or
damaged private property without just
compensation.

(2)

Compensation and damages shall be assessed
according to the requirements of Chapter 34,
Title 78.

The language in the initial sentence is strikingly
similar to Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution
which states "Private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation."

Clearly, the

waiver contained in Utah Code Ann. §6 3-30-10.5 makes Utah Code
Ann. §6 3-30-3 inapplicable in circumstances which would be in
conflict with Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution.
Obviously, the only logical interpretation of Utah
Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1986) is that the immunity bestowed is
qualified rather than absolute.

Any other reasoning would

place the statute and the constitutional provision hopelessly
in conflict.

(See supra, Point II, C ) . If the immunity is

termed absolute, the waiver provision could not operate to
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save the Utah Governmental Immunity Act from constitutional
attack.
Under the cloak of governmental immunity, which has
been ever-increasing in coverage, the state and its political
subdivisions can effectively negate the purpose of Article I,
Section 22. Whenever property is negligently damaged pursuant
to a governmental function (public use), cities and counties
should be required to pay compensation pursuant to the constitutional provision.

The constitutional provision contained in

Article I, Section 22 is negated if cities and counties are
relieved from such liability through the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act.

This places Utah Code Ann. §6 3-30-3 squarely in

conflict with an express constitutional provision and therefore §6 3-30-3 should be declared unconstitutional.
POINT IV.
TO EFFECTUATE THE PURPOSE OF THE UTAH
COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, THE FAULT OF ALL
TORTFEASORS MUST BE COMPARED. GRANTING
BOUNTIFUL CITY'S AND DAVIS COUNTY'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WOULD MAKE THAT
COMPARISON IMPOSSIBLE.
The Utah Comparative Fault Act requires the fault of
all parties to an occurrence to be compared at trial in order
for the fault of the respective parties to be accurately
apportioned.

This result is mandated even if the City and

County are held to be immune and thus not required to
monetarily compensate the plaintiff-homeowners.

Two of Utah's

comparative fault statutes merit special attention.

These are

Utah Code Ann. §78-27-38 (1987) and Utah Code Ann. §78-27-40
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(1987).
§78-27-38 Comparative Negligence, . . .
However, no defendant is liable to any person
seeking recovery for any amount in excess of
the proportion of fault attributable to that
defendant,
§78-27-40. Amount of Liability Limited
to Proportion of Fault—No Contribution,
Subject to §78-27-38, the maximum amount for
which a defendant may be liable to any person
seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that defendant.
No defendant is entitled to contribution from
any other person.
To effectuate the purpose of these two provisions, it is critical that the actions of both Bountiful City and Davis County
be taken into account by the trier of fact.

If the City and

County are released from this action, and assuming that the
landowners and developers are found to be liable to the
homeowners, it is obvious that the landowners and developers
will be assessed a damage award that is in excess of the
proportion of fault actually attributable to them.
The 1986 Comparative Negligence Act abolished the
doctrine of joint and several liability in Utah.

Releasing

the City and County from this action will effectively subject
third-party plaintiffs to joint and several liability.

This

certainly does not appear to be the intent of the Legislature.
Obviously, the Legislature intended that no party be held
responsible for more than his pro-rata share of overall fault.
Fairness dictates that the fault of Davis County and Bountiful
City simply must be compared on the special verdict form submitted to the jury.
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Other jurisdictions which have examined this issue
have held that all parties1 proportion of fault must be ascertained by the trier of fact even if a party cannot be held
legally responsible for his proportion of fault.

An early case

espousing this view is Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867 (Kan. 1978).
In Brown, the owner of an automobile involved in an
intersectional accident while being driven by his son, sued the
other driver to recover for damages sustained to his vehicle.
Apparently, prior to this action, the defendant had settled
with the driver, (the son) out of court.

In this proceeding,

she did not seek to have the son joined as an additional formal party to the action.

The trier of fact found that the

owner was 0% negligent, his son was 90% negligent, and the
defendant was 10% negligent.

The defendant's vehicle sustained

$5,42 3 in damages; therefore the trial court entered judgment
for the plaintiff for 10% of that amount, i.e., $542.30.
Thus, the issue was whether it was appropriate to
ascertain the proportion of fault of a party not formally
joined to the action.

The court held that,

ff

[T]he intent and

purpose of the legislature in adopting K.S.A. 60-258a [the
Kansas Comparative Negligence Act] was to impose individual
liability for damages based on the proportionate fault of all
parties to the occurrence which gave rise to the injuries and
damages even though one or more parties cannot be joined formally as a litigant or be held legally responsible for his or
her proportionate fault."

Id. at 876.
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As a prelude to this

holding, the court discussed the policy considerations applicable in reaching this determination.

The court stated:

There is nothing inherently fair about a
defendant who is 10% at fault paying 100%
of the loss, and there is no social policy
that should compel defendants to pay more
than their fair share of the loss. Plaintiffs
now take the parties as they find them. If
one of the parties at fault happens to be a
spouse or a governmental agency and if by
reason of some competing social policy the
plaintiff cannot receive payment for his
injuries from the spouse or agency, there is
no compelling social policy which requires the
codefendant to pay more than his fair share
of the loss. IcL at 874.
An additional Kansas case that deals with this issue
is Wilson v. Probst, 581 P.2d 380 (Kan. 1978).

In Wilson, a

passenger of a vehicle brought an action for injuries
sustained in a vehicular collision.

The motorist of the vehi-

cle in which the plaintiff was not a passenger joined the
Secretary of Transportation as an additional party defendant
based on the state's alleged negligence concerning the claimed
highway defects.

The Kansas Supreme Court held that the

Secretary of Transportation was immune from liability based on
negligence.

Thus, the issue arose as to whether the other

defendants to the lawsuit were entitled to have the negligence
of the Secretary of Transportation taken into account in
determining their proportionate share of liability.
The court quoted Brown v. Keill for the proposition
that the proportion of fault of all parties to the occurrence
must be taken into account even though one or more of the parties cannot be joined formally as a litigant or be held
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legally responsible for his or her proportionate fault.

The

court went on to state, "In the context of comparative
negligence, highway defects claimed to have contributed to the
occurrence from which the injuries and damages arose must be
compared to the alleged negligence of other parties if the
intent of K.S.A. 60-258a is to be accomplished." Id. at 384.
The court then resolved the issue of whether the
Secretary of Transportation must remain as a named party to
the action or whether the trial court could enter an order
allowing his percentage of negligence to be ascertained by the
jury but dismissing him as a party for other purposes since no
ultimate liability could be established against him.

The court

held that an additional party defendant in a comparative negligence action may not be dismissed from an action solely because
of his immunity.

1^3. at 384. Therefore, the court required

that the Secretary of Transportation remain as a named party
in the action to adequately apportion the respective fault.
This type of apportionment has also been held to apply
in instances in which the identity of the alleged concurrent
tortfeasor was unknown.

In Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding

Supply, Inc., 646 P.2d 579 (N.M. App. 1982), an action was
brought arising out of an automobile accident involving three
vehicles.

The driver of one of the cars involved in the

accident was unknown.

The jury found the defendant to be 30%

at fault and found the unknown driver to be 70% at fault.

The

New Mexico court utilized this opinion to hold that the concept
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of joint and several liability was not retained with the adoption of comparative negligence.

The court therefore affirmed

the jury's apportionment of liability for the damages sustained
by the plaintiff though the unknown driver was not a party to
the action and such a finding in essence precluded the plaintiff from receiving compensation for 70% of his damages.

The

court stated:
Joint and several liability is not to be retained in our pure comparative negligence system
on the basis that a plaintiff must be favored.
We hold that defendant is not liable for the
entire damage caused by defendant and the
unknown driver. Defendant, as a concurrent
tortfeasor, is not liable on a theory of joint
and several liability. Id. at 586.
Workmen's compensation presents another area in which
the fact finder is entitled to apportion the respective negligence of all parties involved in the dispute even if one party
cannot be held liable to the plaintiff by operation of law.
Connar v. West Shore Equipment of Milwaukee, 227 N.W.2d 660
(Wise. 1975), is illustrative of this point.

Connar concerned

an appeal brought to ascertain whether it was proper to
exclude from the special verdict form a question relating to
the negligence of the employer, when the employer was not a
party to the negligence action and could not be held liable by
reason of the exclusivity of the workmen's compensation
remedy.

In holding that it was proper to ask the jury to con-

sider the negligence of the employer, the court stated:
It is established without doubt that, when
apportioning negligence, a jury must have the
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opportunity to consider the negligence of all
parties to the transaction, whether or not
they be parties to the lawsuit and whether or
not they can be liable to the plaintiff or to
the other tortfeasors either by operation of law
or because of a prior release. . . . At the
requested-special-verdict stage of a lawsuit,
it is immaterial that the entity is not a
party or is immune from further liability.
[Citations omitted] [T]he apportionment must
include all whose negligence may have contributed to the arising of the cause of action.
Id. at 662.
The Idaho court adopted this rule in Pocatello Ind.
Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 621 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1980).

The

Idaho court stated that, "The reason for such [a rule] is that
true apportionment cannot be achieved unless that apportionment
includes all tortfeasors guilty of causal negligence either
causing or contributing to the occurrence in question, whether
or not they are parties to the case." IcL at 403, quoting Heft
& Heft, Comparative Negligence Manual §8.131, at 12 (1978).
The Idaho court also noted that apparently only Florida has
adopted a contrary position.

Other cases espousing this view-

point include Bode v. Clark Equip. Co., 719 P.2d 824 (Okla.
1986); Couch v. Thomas, 497 N.E.2d 1372 (Ohio App. 1985).
The treatises which discuss this issue are in accord
in concluding that the better reasoned approach is to require
the negligence of all concurrent tortfeasors, whether they are
parties to the action or not, to be taken into account by the
jury in apportioning liability.
It is accepted practice to include all tortfeasors in the apportionment question. This
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includes nonparties who may be unknown tortfeasors, phantom drivers, and persons alleged
to be negligent but not liable in damages to
the injured party such as in the third-party
cases arising in the workmen's compensation
area. Heft & Heft, Comparative Negligence
Manual, §8.100, at 14 (Rev. Ed.)
See also, Schwartz, Comparative Negligence, at 262-3 (2d Ed.
1986) .
Numerous other authorities can be cited in support of
this proposition.

See also, American Motorcycle Assn. v.

Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 578 P.2d 899 (Ca. 1978);
Lines v. Ryan, 272 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. 1978); Barron v. United
States, 473 F.Supp. 1077 (D. Haw. 1979), affd. in part and
revfd in part 654 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1981).
In summation, it is evident that the respective negligence of Bountiful City and Davis County must be apportioned
by the finder of fact in order to comply with the stated purpose of the Utah Comparative Fault Act.

This is mandated

even if Bountiful City and Davis County are found to be immune
from liability to the plaintiff-homeowners.

The only question

remaining is whether to require Bountiful City and Davis
County to remain as parties to the action or whether to merely
require that the jury assess their respective negligence on
the special verdict form and reduce the liability, if any, of
the landowners and developers accordingly.

The interests of

accuracy and equity compel the conclusion that Bountiful City
and Davis County should remain as named parties to the action.
This will facilitate a more in depth development of the evi-46-

dence to aid the trier of fact in reaching a just result.
CONCLUSION
This appeal involves several issues regarding the
construction, application and constitutionality of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act.

In regard to the construction of

the Act, landowners and developers submit to this Court that
the trial court erred in classifying Bountiful City's and
Davis County's actions as involving the "management of flood
waters" or the "construction, repair, and operation of flood
and storm systems."

The activities of Bountiful City and

Davis County which are at issue concern unwarranted delays and
negligent decision making.

These activities are not granted

immunity pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1986).

The mere

fact that these activities resulted in a flood will not, or
should not, place them within the confines of Utah Code Ann.
§63-30-3 (1986).
Second, the acts and omissions of Davis County and
Bountiful City do not constitute a governmental function as
defined by applicable case law or statutory law and therefore
no immunity applies.

Even if the activities of the City and

County were found to be a governmental function, immunity has
been waived for those acts by express statutory waivers. Also,
even were one to conclude that the conduct of Bountiful City
and Davis County constituted a governmental function in the
sense that those acts and omissions consisted of "the management of flood waters and/or the construction repair or operation
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of flood and storm systems," such a finding would only result
in qualified immunity rather than an absolute grant of immunity.
Such qualified immunity is overridden by the express statutory
waivers contained in §§63-30-8, 9, 10 and 10.5.
Third, Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1986) is unconstitutional in light of Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution.

The Utah Governmental Immunity Act could arguably be

applied in situations where the government takes or damages
property pursuant to a public use.

The constitutional provi-

sion requires compensation in such instances, but the
Governmental Immunity Act could operate to extinguish the
governmental entities' liability.
Fourth, even if §63-30-3 is found to be constitutional, and Bountiful City and Davis County are found to be
immune, the purpose and the language of the Comparative Fault
Act require that their respective fault be apportioned by the
jury at the special verdict phase.

To not allow such a result

would effectively subject third-party plaintiffs to joint and
several liability which has been statutorily abolished in
Utah.

The clear majority of jurisdictions which have examined

the issue of apportionment of fault when a party cannot be
held legally responsible for his percentage of fault or is not
a party to the lawsuit, have held that the immune or absent
party's liability must be apportioned by the jury at the
special verdict phase.

This result is necessary in order to

insure that the defendant who is present is not held liable
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for more than his proportionate degree of fault.
It is respectfully requested that the judgment of the
trial court be reversed, the third-party claims be reinstated,
and the entire case be remanded for trial.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM & JUDY McCLEERY, MARK
& TERESIA PANTELAKIS; DENNIS &
GLORIA ANDERSON; JAMES & LINDA
STOVER; DAVID C. FRICKE; BARRIE
D. & KATHERINE BREWER; RONALD &
KERMA JONES; RICHARD & BARBARA
KRISTENSEN; LYLE & ALICE
LARAINE GORDON; and S. MICHAEL
& SANDRA J. INMAN,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
Civil No.:

40616

v.
LANDFORMS CONSTRUCTION CORP.;
LANDFORMS DEVELOPMENT INC.;
MARK S. SANDBERG; L. WAYNE
REDD; LYLE A. HALE;
HALE/REDD INVESTMENT GROUP, a
general partnership a/k/a REDD
HALE INVESTMENT GROUP;
HALE/REDD LAND INVESTMENT, a
joint venture; VERL G. SMART;
and THE CONSORTIUM, INC.,
Defendants.

Judge Rodney S. Page

flUtfft

LANDPORMS DEVELOPMENT, INC.;
MARK S. SANDBERG; L. WAYNE
REDD; LYLE A. HALE; HALE/REDD
INVESTMENT GROUP, a General
Partnership, a/k/a REDD HALE
INVESTMENT GROUP; HALE/REDD
LAND INVESTMENT, a joint
venture,

:
:
:
:
:
:
s
:

Third-Party Plaintiffs,:
v.

:

BOUNTIFUL CITY and DAVIS COUNTY,:
Third-Party Defendants.:
Third-Party Defendants Bountiful City and Davis Countyfs
Motions

for

Summary

Judgment

came on for hearing

before the

above-entitled Court on September 6, 1988. Third-Party Plaintiff
Bountiful City was represented by Layne B. Forbes, City Attorney.
Third-Party Defendant Davis County was represented by Gerald E.
Hess, Chief Civil Deputy Attorney for Davis County.
Plaintiff

Landforms

Construction

Corporation,

Third-Party
Landforms

Development, Inc. were represented by Attorney Robert A. Burton.
Third-Party Plaintiffs Mark S. Sandberg, L. Wayne Redd, Lyle A.
Hale, Hale/Redd Investment Group, Hale/Redd Land Investment were
represented by Attorney Lowell V. Smith.
Having considered and reviewed the pleadings, affidavits
and Memorandums of Points and Authorities on file, and being
fully advised in the premises, the Court concludes:
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1.

Utah

Code

Governmental Immunity Act

Annotated

Section

63-30-3,

the

("Act"), grants absolute immunity to

the management of flood water and other natural disasters and
grants immunity

in the construction, repair and operation of

flood and storm systems by governmental entities.
2.

Count

I of the Amended

Third-Party

Complaint

against Bountiful City and Davis County alleges that all flood
and storm control work performed by Third-Party Plaintiffs was
done

in

accordance

with

Davis

County

and

Bountiful

City

requirements and was done with the approval of Davis County and
Bountiful City; that Third-Party Plaintiffs were prevented from
constructing their own storm detention basin by the negligent and
careless

actions

of

Bountiful

City

and

Davis

County;

that

Bountiful City and Davis County negligently delayed making a
decision

concerning

the

construction

of

a

detention basin and that such delay affected

regional

storm

the ability of

Third-Party Plaintiffs to construct their own, on-site detention
basin;

and

that

Bountiful

City

and

Davis

County

required

Third-Party Plaintiffs to construct a roadway through the entire
development

project,

which

roadway

operated

as

a funnel or

channel for the water, mud and silt which caused the plaintiffs1
damages.

The

indemnification,

Amended

Third-Party

contribution

and/or

a

Complaint
comparison

of

between Third-Party Plaintiffs and Third-Party Defendants.
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seeks
fault

3.

Count II of the Amended Third-Party

Complaint

seeks recovery from Davis County pursuant to a contract whereby
Davis
basin.

County

was obligated

to construct

a regional detention

It is alleged that the regional detention basin was not

timely constructed and that the damages sustained by plaintiffs
were the proximate result of the alleged breach of contract by
Davis County.
4.

The immunity granted by the Act extends to the

acts, or the failure to do the acts, of planning, designing,
constructing, repairing and operating or managing flood waters
and other natural disasters and in the constructing, repairing
and operating of flood and storm systems before, during or after
an actual flood emergency.
5.
Third-Party

With the exception of Count II of the Amended
Complaint

against

Davis

County,

all

acts

and

omissions of Davis County and Bountiful City upon which ThirdParty Plaintiffs seek to rely to impose liability upon Bountiful
City and Davis County are shielded by the broad grant of immunity
contained in Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Annotated.
6.

The Court determines there is no just reason for

delay and, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court hereby directs the entry of a final judgment
as set forth below.
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WHEREFORE/ it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as
follows:
1.

On the basis of governmental immunity as contained

in Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Annotated/ Third-Party Defendant
Bountiful City's Motion for Summary Judgment be and is hereby
granted

and

the Amended

Third-Party

Complaint

of Third-Party

Plaintiffs be and is hereby dismissed with prejudice and on the
merits*

Final judgment is hereby entered in favor of Third-Party

Defendant Bountiful City and against Third-Party Plaintiffs, no
cause of action, with each party to bear his or its own costs.
2.

On the basis of governmental immunity as contained

in Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Annotated/ Third-Party Defendant
Davis Countyfs Motion

for Summary

Judgment

be and is hereby

granted as to Count One of the Amended Third-Party Complaint and
Count One of the Amended Third-Party Complaint be and hereby is
dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits.

Final judgment as

to the claims set forth in Count One of the Amended Third-Party
Complaint

is hereby entered in favor of Third-Party Defendant

Davis County

and against Third-Party Plaintiffs, no cause of

action/ with each party to bear his or its own costs.
3.
Summary

Third-Party Defendant Davis County's Motion for

Judgment

Complaint

as to Count Two of the Amended

is hereoy denied/

provided/

Third-Party

however/ that the only

issues remaining as to Count Two are as to whether or not there

-5-

was any breach by Davis County of the Agreement dated May 12,
1986, between Davis County and the Hale/Redd Investment, and the
damages, if any, sustained after January 12, 1987.
DATED this

Odr

||1^ day of Scptcmbo-g, 1988.
BY THE COORT:

Approved as to Form:

LA^NE'B. £0#BES~
Attorney for Bountiful City

IRAL&-E". HESS
Attorney for Davis County

ROBERT A^TBURTON
Attorney for Landform Construction
Corp. and Landforms Development, Inc.

o-

LOWELL V. SMITH
Attorney for Mark S. Sandberg,
L. Wayne Redd, Lyle A. Hale,
Hale/Redd Investment Group, and
Hale/Redd Land Investment
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L. Rich Humpherys, #1582
Christensen, Jensen & Powell, P.C.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS
510 Clark Learning Building
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84
Telephone: (801)
IN Tra^si
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
JSI ATE -&F~&EMt~WILLIAM & JUDY McCLEERY, MARK &
TERESIA PANTELAKIS; DENNIS &
GLORIA ANDERSON; JAMES & LINDA
STOVER; DAVID C. FRICKE; BARRIE
D. & KATHERINE BREWER; RONALD &
KERMA JONES; RICHARD & BARBARA
KRISTENSEN; LYLE & ALICE LARAINE
GORDON; and S. MICHAEL & SANDRA
J. INMAN,

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,
v.
LANDFORMS CONSTRUCTION CORP.;
LANDFORMS DEVELOPMENT INC.;
MARK S. SANDBERG; L. WAYNE REDD;
LYLE A. HALE; HALE/REDD
INVESTMENT GROUP, a general
PARTNERSHIP, a/k/a REDD HALE
INVESTMENT GROUP; HALE/REDD LAND
INVESTMENT, a joint venture;
VERL G. SMART; and THE
CONSORTIUM, INC.,

Civil No. 40616

Defendants.
Plaintiffs

complain

against

defendants

and

allege

as

follows:
PARTIES
1.

Plaintiffs William & Judy McCleery are residents of

Davis County, State of Utah, and at all times mentioned herein

owned and resided on the real property located at 329 West 3500
South, Bountiful, Utah.
2.

Plaintiffs Mark & Teresia Pantelakis are residents of

Davis County, State of Utah, and at all times mentioned herein
owned and resided on the real property located at 388 West Davis
Boulevard, Bountiful, Utah.
3.

Plaintiffs Dennis & Gloria Anderson are residents of

Davis County, State of Utah, and at all times mentioned herein
owned and resided on the real property located at 3737 Monarch
Drive, Bountiful, Utah*
4.

Plaintiffs James & Linda Stover are residents of Davis

County, State of Utah, and at all times mentioned herein owned
and resided on the real property located 482 West 3600 South,
Bountiful, Utah.
5.

Plaintiffs David C. Fricke was a resident of Davis

County, State of Utah, and at all times mentioned herein owned
and resided on the real property located at 3647 South Carriage
Lane, Bountiful, Utah.
6.

Plaintiffs Barrie D. & Katherine Brewer are residents

of Davis County, State of Utah, and at all times mentioned herein
owned and resided on the real property located at 447 West 3500
South, Bountiful, Utah.
7.

Plaintiffs Ronald & Kerma Jones are residents of Davis

County, State of Utah, and at all times mentioned herein owned
and

resided

on the

real property
2

located

at 357 West Davis

Boulevard, Bountiful, Utah.
8.

Plaintiffs Richard & Barbara Kristensen are residents

of Davis County, State of Utah, and at all times mentioned herein
owned and resided on the real property located at 3302 South 300
West, Bountiful, Utah.
9.

Plaintiffs Lyle and Alice Laraine Gordon are residents

of Davis County, State of Utah, and at all times mentioned herein
owned and resided on the real property located at 3326 South 300
West, Bounti ful, Utah.
10.
residents

Plaintiffs
of

S.

Davis County,

Michael

and

Sandra

J.

Inman

are

State of Utah, and at all times

mentioned herein owned and resided on the real property located
at 3301 South 350 West, Bountiful, Utah.
11.

Defendant

Landforms

Construction

Corp.

is a Utah

corporation with its principal place of business in Bountiful,
Utah.
12.

Landforms Development Inc. is a Utah corporation with

its principal place of business in Bountiful, Utah.
13.

Defendants Mark S. Sandberg, L. Wayne Redd and Lyle A.

Hale have been residents of Davis County, Utah, during all times
mentioned herein.
14.

Defendant Hale/Redd Investment Group a/k/a Redd Hale

Investment Group is a general partnership, made up of defendants
Redd, Sandberg and Lyle A. Hale as partners, and has been doing
business in Davis County, Utah.
3

15.

Defendant Hale/Redd Land Investment is a joint venture

made up of some or all of the above defendants, and has been
doing business in Davis County, Utah.
16.

Defendant Verl G. Smart has been a resident of Davis

County, Utah, and/or has owned a part of the property in Davis
County which is described below.
17.

Defendant The Consortium, Inc. is a Utah corporation,

with its principal place of business in Davis County, Utah.
18.

At all times material hereto, defendants and each of

them worked in concert or as agents of the other.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligence)
19.
involved

Defendants have owned an interest in and/or have been
and

participated

in

the

planning,

development

and

construction of improvements on large parcels of real property
situated

above plaintiffs1

respective

residences.

This real

property shall be referred to hereafter as "the Real Property.11
20.

Through

their

negligently

and

carelessly

constructed

the

Real

changed

the

natural

acts

and

planned,

omissions,
designed,

defendants

developed
in

and

Property

improvements

and

so doing

conditions

and contour

of the property,

thereby increasing, aggravating, concentrating and diverting the
natural flow of runoff water from the property.
21.

As a direct and proximate result of the negligence and

carelessness of defendants, plaintiffs have suffered substantial
4

flooding damages to their residences and personal property in an
amount to be established at the time of trial.

As a further

cause of defendants1 negligence and carelessness, plaintiffs have
suffered a devaluation in their property and have suffered other
consequential

and

general damages

in excess

of Five Hundred

Thousand Dollars ($500,000).
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Trespass)
22.

Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 23 above.

23.

The wrongful actions and omissions of defendants in

allowing

excessive

plaintiffs1

and

properties

substantial

on numerous

runoff
different

water

to

flood

occasions

since

December, 1985, constitutes unlawful trespasses.
24.

As

a

direct

and

proximate

result

of defendants1

unlawful trespasses, plaintiffs are entitled to recover against
defendants all special, consequential and general damages in an
amount in excess of Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000).
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Nuisance)
25.
26.

Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 26 above.
The

instances of

flooding

caused

by the wrongful

actions and omissions of the defendants have occurred on numerous
occasions since December, 1985, as recent as August, 1987, and
plaintiffs

believe

and

therefore

allege that

the actions of

defendants and the conditions on the Real Property in question
5

have not been corrected and will continue to result in more
flooding each time there is significant rainfall.
27.

The wrongful actions and omissions of defendants have

substantially interfered with plaintiffs1 use and enjoyment of
their property and therefore constitute a continuing nuisance.
28.

On numerous occasions, plaintiffs have given notice to

defendants of their wrongful conduct and have made demand that
the unsafe conditions be corrected; but defendants have failed
and refused to abate said nuisance.

Plaintiffs are therefore

threatened by the continuing nuisance through an indefinite time
in the future.
29.
conduct

Unless the unsafe conditions caused by the wrongful
of

additional

defendants
damages.

are

corrected,

Plaintiffs

plaintiffs

are therefore

will

entitled

suffer
to a

permanent injunction restraining defendants from continuing the
nuisance herein described and requiring defendants to abate the
nuisance to avoid additional great and

irreparable injury to

plaintiffs and their properties.
30.

As a direct and proximate

result

of the wrongful

conduct of the defendants which constitute the maintenance of a
nuisance, plaintiffs have sustained
damages

as

described

above.

In

special
addition,

and

consequential

plaintiffs

have

suffered great emotional trauma in being subjected to multiple
floodings of their personal residence and belongings and have
suffered other general damages, for which defendants are liable.
6

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress)

been

31.

Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 32 above.

32.

Defendants have personally witnessed and have otherwise

put

resulting
have

on

notice

therefrom

failed

to

of

the

numerous

since December.

take

reasonable

correct the unsafe conditions.

floodings

and

damages

1985, however, defendants

precautions

and

measures to

By failing to correct such unsafe

conditions, defendants knew or reasonably should have known that
additional flooding would occur to plaintiffs and that flooding
would cause plaintiffs severe emotional distress.
33.

Defendants wrongful actions and omissions have been

outrageous and would constitute the intentional infliction of
distress to the plaintiffs, for which defendants are liable for
all

special,

consequential

and

general

damages

resulting

therefrom.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Punitive Damages)
34.
35.

Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 35 above.
As

a

result

of

defendants1

wrongful

actions and

omissions, defendants have acted maliciously and wantonly and in
complete disregard for the rights and safety of plaintiffs.
36.

In order to deter such conduct of defendants in the

future and prevent the repetition thereof as a practice, by way
of punishment and as an example, plaintiffs pray that exemplary
7

damages

be

awarded

in the

amount

of at

least

Five Hundred

Thousand Dollars ($500,000).
WHEREFORE,

plaintiffs

pray

for

judgment

against

defendants, jointly and severally, as follows:
1.

For all special damages to be proven at the time of

2.

For consequential damages to be proven at the time of

3.

For general damages in an amount in excess of Five

trial;

trial;

Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000);
4.

For exemplary and punitive damages in the amount of at

least Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000);
5.

For prejudgment interest, attorney's fees, and court

6.

For a permanent injunction, restraining defendants

costs;

from the described wrongful conduct and requiring defendants to
correct the unsafe conditions as described above; and
7.

For all other relief deemed equitable and just under

the circumstances.
DATED this /^ciav of October, 1987.
Christensen, Jenqen

By:,.^V

J^l*. Ricli Humpherys ^//
Attorney for Plaintriffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY

CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the

foregoing FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT was mailed, postage prepaid,
this fq"^ day of October, 1987, to:
Robert A. Burton
Strong & Hanni
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS LANDFORM
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

<7~ ^ ^
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Lr:3 AUG 24 AM 9= 38
Robert A. Burton, #0516
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Landforms
Construction Group,
Landforms Development, Inc.,
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

.• <a:**

Lowell V. Smith, #3006
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
Attorneys for Mark S. Sandberg,
L. Wayne Redd, Lyle A. Hale,
Hale/Redd Investment Group, a
general partnership, a/k/a Redd
Hale Investment Group, Hale/Redd
Land Investment, a joint venture
175 South West Temple, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 36 3-7611
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM & JUDY McCLEERY;
MARK & TERESA PANTELAKIS;
DENNIS & GLORIA ANDERSON;
JAMES & LINDA STOVER; DAVID
C. FRICKE; BARRIE D. &
KATHERINE BREWER; RONALD &
KERMA JONES; RICHARD & BARBARA
KRISTENSEN; LYLE & ALICE
LARAINE GORDON; and S. MICHAEL
& SANDRA J. INMAN,

AMENDED CROSSCLAIM AND
AMENDED THIRD-PARTY
COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,
vs
LANDFORMS CONSTRUCTION CORP.;
LANDFORMS DEVELOPMENT, INC.;
MARK S. SANDBERG; L. WAYNE REDD;
LYLE A. HALE; HALE/REDD
INVESTMENT GROUP, a General

L4
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Partnership, a/k/a REDD HALE
INVESTMENT GROUP; HALE/REDD
LAND INVESTMENT, a joint
venture; VERL G. SMART; and
THE CONSORTIUM, INC.,
Defendants.
LANDFORMS DEVELOPMENT, INC.;
MARK S. SANDBERG; L. WAYNE REDD;
LYLE A. HALE; HALE/REDD
INVESTMENT GROUP, a General
Partnership, a/k/a REDD HALE
INVESTMENT GROUP; HALE/REDD
LAND INVESTMENT, a joint
venture,
Third-Party
Plaintiffs,
vs.
BOUNTIFUL CITY and DAVIS
COUNTY,
Third-Party
Defendants.

AMENDED CROSSCLAIM
Defendants Landforrns Construction Corp., Landforms
Development, Inc., Mark S. Sandberg, L. Wayne Redd, Lyle A. Hale,
Hale/Redd Investment Group, a general partnership, a/k/a Redd Hale
Investment Group and Hale/Redd Land Investment, a joint venture,
crossclaim against co-defendant The Consortium, Inc. and allege as
follows:
1.

Plaintiffs have commenced an action in the above-

entitled court by virtue of an Amended Complaint, dated October

L4
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19, 1987, wherein plaintiffs allege that these defendants are
liable to plaintiffs for damages.
2.

In their Amended Complaint plaintiffs have also set

forth claims against The Consortium, Inc.
3.

These defendants deny liability to plaintiffs.

4.

These defendants allege that engineering and design

work on the property in question was performed by The Consortium.
5.

The Consortium also rendered professional advice and

counsel to these defendants regarding temporary storm detention
facilities.
6.

In the event the engineering and design work was

negligently performed, or the professional advice and counsel was
negligently given, the responsibility for this negligence rests
with The Consortium and not these defendants.
7.

In the event these defendants are found liable to

plaintiffs, which liability is expressly denied, then said
liability would be passive, secondary and substitute in nature,
whereas the liability of The Consortium would be primary and
active in nature.

Therefore, in such event, these defendants and

counterclalmants are entitled to be fully indemnified and recover
judgment over against The Consortium for the full amount of any
judgment rendered against these defendants in favor of plaintiffs,
together with all costs and attorney's fees incurred by these
defendants.

r
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8.

In the alternative and in the event these defendants

are found to be jointly liable with The Consortium for damages
allegedly sustained by plaintiffs, and thus under the circumstances not entitled to complete indemnity, then these defendants
are entitled to contribution from The Consortium in accordance
with the Utah comparative negligence statutes in effect when
plaintiffs first began to complain of damages,
9.

Pursuant to §78-27-37 et seq. [Utah Code Annotated

(1986)], these defendants are entitled to have the fault of The
Consortium determined on the special verdict submitted to the
jury, and any fault found to rest with The Consortium should
reduce the liability, if any, of these defendants to plaintiffs.
WHEREFORE, in the event these defendants should be found
liable to plaintiffs, which liability is expressly denied, then
these defendants demand judgment against co-defendant The
Consortium as follows:
(1)

Full and complete indemnity.

(2)

Contribution.

(3) Comparison of fault of all parties pursuant to
current comparative fault statutes.
(4) Costs of court and such other and further relief as
to the court seems just and equitable.

L4
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AMENDED THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT
Defendants and third-party plaintiffs Landforms
Construction Corp., Landforms Development, Inc., Mark S. Sandberg,
L. Wayne Redd, Lyle A. Hale, Hale/Redd Investment Group, a general
partnership, a/k/a Redd Hale Investment Group and Hale/Redd Land
Investment, a joint venture, complain of Bountiful City and Davis
County and allege as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs have commenced an action in the above-

entitled court by virtue of an Amended Complaint dated October 19,
1987, wherein plaintiffs allege that these defendants are liable
to plaintiffs for damages.
2.

These defendants and third-party plaintiffs reallege

and incorporate by reference herein the jurisdictional
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 17 of plaintiffs1
Amended Complaint.
3.

Third-party plaintiffs deny liability to plaintiffs.
COUNT I

4.

Third-party plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by

reference herein paragraphs 1 through 3 of the Third-Party
Complaint.
5.

All flood and storm control work performed by third-

party plaintiffs or their contractors on the Bridlewood
Subdivision was done in accordance with Davis County and
Bountiful City requirements with the approval of Davis County and
Bountiful City-

If the work was negligently performed, which
-5-

third-party plaintiffs deny, this was because Bountiful City and
Davis County requirements were deficient.
6.

Third-party plaintiffs were prevented from

developing their own storm detention basin by the negligent and
careless actions of Bountiful City and Davis County.
7.

Bountiful City and Davis County negligently delayed

the construction of the Bridlewood Subdivision by their indecision
with respect to the regional detention basin and their delay in
other matters.

This delay caused a potential flood hazard to

exist in that Bridlewood remained only partially completed without
curb and gutter, asphalt roads, catch basins, and a permanent
storm detention facility for a much longer period of time than
third-party plaintiffs originally planned or reasonably
anticipated.
8.

Bountiful City and Davis County negligently delayed

making a decision on the regional storm detention basin for
several months.

Thereafter, Bountiful City and Davis County

negligently delayed working out any meaningful plan for the
construction and implementation of the detention basin.

These

delays affected the ability of third-party plaintiffs to move
ahead with the Bridlewood project.
9.

Third-party plaintiffs desired to develop Bridlewood

in three phases and did not desire to cut a roadway into the
subdivision from top to bottom, but rather planned to develop the

L4
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road in short phases or increments.
10.

Bountiful City and Davis County negligently and

carelessly required third-party plaintiffs to cut one roadway in
Brldlewood from top to bottom, and refused to allow the roadway to
be developed in phases.
11.

Cutting the roadway from the top of the Brldlewood

Subdivision to the bottom required much more excavation than
third-party plaintiffs had planned and required more land to be
devegetated than third-party plaintiffs initially planned.
According to plaintiffs, these factors contributed to plaintiffs1
damages.
12.

According to plaintiffs, the long roadway from the

top of Brldlewood to the bottom acted as a funnel or channel for
water, mud, and silt which the plaintiffs alleged flowed onto
their property and caused them damage.
13.

Damages, if any, sustained by plaintiffs resulted

from plaintiffs1 own negligent actions, acts of God, and the
omissions and negligent actions of The Consortium, Davis County,
and Bountiful City.
14.

In the event these defendants are found liable to

plaintiffs, which liability is expressly denied, then said
liability would be passive, secondary and substitute in nature,
whereas the liability of Bountiful City and Davis County would be
primary and active in nature.

Therefore, in such event, these

defendants are entitled to be fully indemnified and recover

L4
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judgment over against Bountiful City and Davis County for the full
amount of any judgment rendered against them in favor of
plaintiffs, together with all costs and attorney's fees incurred
by these defendants.
15.

In the alternative and in the event these defendants

are found to be jointly liable with Bountiful City and Davis
County for damages allegedly sustained by plaintiffs, and thus
under the circumstances not entitled to complete indemnity, then
these defendants are entitled to contribution from Bountiful City
and Davis County in accordance with the Utah comparative
negligence statutes in effect when plaintiffs first began to
complain of damages.
16.

Pursuant to §78-27-37 et seq. [Utah Code Annotated

(1986)], these defendants are entitled to have the fault of
Bountiful City and Davis County determined on the special verdict
submitted to the jury, and any fault found to rest with Bountiful
City and Davis County should reduce the liability, if any, of
these defendants to plaintiffs.
COUNT II
17.

These defendants reallege and incorporate by

reference herein paragraphs 1 through 16 of the Third-Party
Complaint.
18.

On or about May 12, 1986, defendant Hale/Redd

Investment Group signed a contract with Davis County, a copy of
which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.
L4
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19.

Pursuant to the contract, Davis County was obligated

to construct a regional detention storm basin for the protection
of these defendants and third-party plaintiffs.

The purpose of

this basin was to control runoff, to prevent flooding, and
protect these defendants from potential claims.
20.

The detention basin was not timely constructed.

Plaintiffs claim to have sustained damages after the basin should
have been constructed and operational.
21.

If the plaintiffs have sustained damages since the

construction and operation of the regional detention basin, this
damage resulted from the negligent design and operation of the
basin.
22.

Damages sustained by plaintiffs, if any, were caused

by Davis County's breach of its agreement to properly and timely
construct the regional detention basin.
23.

Pursuant to contract, these defendants are entitled

to be indemnified and held harmless from and against any and all
claims asserted by plaintiffs against them.
24.

In the event it is determined that these defendants

are not entitled to full and complete indemnity under the
contract, these defendants are nevertheless entitled to an implied
right of contribution pursuant to the contract.
25.

Pursuant to contract, these defendants are entitled

to recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred by them
in the defense of this action,
WHEREFORE, in-the event these defendants should be found

liable to plaintiffs, which liability is expressly denied, then
these defendants demand judgment against third-party defendants
Bountiful City and Davis County as follows:
(1)

Full and complete indemnity.

(2) Contribution.
(3)

Comparison of fault of all parties pursuant to

current comparative fault statutes.
(4)

Costs of court and such other and further relief as

to the court seems just and equitable.
Dated this

^

day of

/y^g L K\

1987.

Burton
Attorneys for Defendants and
Third-Party Plaintiffs
Landforms Construction Group,
Landforms Development, Inc.,
LOWELL V. SMITH
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
Attorneys for Mark S. Sandberg,
L. Wayne Redd, Lyle A. Hale,
Hale/Redd Investment Group, a
general partnership, a/k/a Redd
Hale Investment Group, Hale/Redd
Land Investment, a joint venture
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the^
foregoing was mailed, first class postage prepaid, this
f

t

UJJ//J^L-

* 1987, to the following:
L. Rich Humpherys
Christensen, Jensen & Powell, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
510 Clark Learning Building
175 South West Temple.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Melvin C. Wilson
Davis County Attorney
Gerald E. Hess
Chief Civil Deputy
Davis County Courthouse
P. O. Box 618
Farmington, Utah 84025
D. Michael Nielsen
Attorney at Law
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Layne B. Forbes
Bountiful City Attorney
P. 0. Box 331
Bountiful, Utah 84010
George F. Fadel
Attorney at Law
170 West 500 South
Bountiful, Utah 84010

—
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v..

/A

day

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 22
[Private property for public use,]
Private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-30-2 (Supp. 1988)
Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1)

"Claim" means any claim or cause of action for
money or damages against a governmental entity
or against an employee.

(2)

(a)

"Employee" includes a governmental entity's
officers, employees, servants, trustees,
commissioners, members of a governing body,
members of a board, members of a commission,
or members of an advisory body, student
teachers certificated in accordance with
Section 53A-6-101, educational aides,
students engaged in providing services to
members of the public in the course of an
approved medical, nursing, or other
professional health care clinical training
program, volunteers, and tutors, but does
not include an independent contractor.

(b)

"Employee" includes all of the positions
identified in Subsection (2)(a), whether or
not the individual holding that position
receives compensation.

(3)

"Governmental entity" means the state and its
political subdivisions as defined in this chapter.

(4)

(a)

"Governmental function" means any act,
failure to act, operation, function, or
undertaking of a governmental entity
whether or not the act, failure to act,
operation, function, or undertaking is
characterized as governmental, proprietary,
a core governmental function, unique to
government, undertaken in a dual capacity,
essential to or not essential to a government or governmental function, or could be
performed by private enterprise or private
persons.
A-27

(b) A "governmental function" may be performed
by any department, agency, employee, agent,
or officer of a governmental entity.
(5)

"Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage
to or loss of property, or any other injury that
a person may suffer to his person, or estate,
that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his agent.

(6)

"Personal injury" means an injury of any kind
other than property damage.

(7)

"Political subdivision" means any county, city,
town, school, district, public transit district,
redevelopment agency, special improvement or
taxing district, or other governmental
subdivision or public corporation.

(8)

"Property damage" means injury to, or loss of,
any right, title, estate, or interest in real or
personal property.

(9)

"State" means the state of Utah, and includes any
office, department, agency, authority, commission,
board, institution, hospital, college, university,
or other instrumentality of the state.

Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-30-3 (1986)
Immunity of governmental entities from suit.
Except as may be otherwise provided in this
chapter, all governmental entities are immune from
suit for any injury which results from the exercise
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned
hospital, nursing home, or other governmental health
care facility, and from an approved medical, nursing,
or other professional health care clinical training
program conducted in either public or private
facilities.
The management of flood waters and other natural
disasters and the construction, repair, and operation
of flood and storm systems by governmental entities
are considered to be governmental functions, and
governmental entities and their officers and employees
are immune from suit for any injury or damage resulting
from those activities.
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Utah Code Annotated, Section 6 3-30-8 (1986)
Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defective,
unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways, bridges,
or other structures•
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe,
or dangerous condition of any highway, road, street,
alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge,
viaduct or other structure located thereon.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-30-9 (1986)
Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous or
defective public building, structure, or other
public improvement—Exception.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived for any injury caused from a dangerous or
defective condition or any public building, structure,
dam, reservoir or other public improvement. Immunity
is not waived for latent defective conditions.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-30-10 (1986)
Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act
or omission of employee—Exceptions—Waiver for
injury caused by violation of fourth amendment rights.
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent
act or omission of an employee committed within the
scope of employment except if the injury:
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; or
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false
imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution,
intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel,
slander, deceit, interference with contract rights,
infliction of mental anguish, or civil rights; or
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(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the failure or refusal
to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit,
license, certificate, approval, order, or similar
authorization; or
(d) arises out of a failure to make an inspection, or by reason of making an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property; or
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding,
even if malicious or without probable cause; or
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation by the
employee whether or not it is negligent or intentional; or
(g) arises out of or results from riots,
unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob
violence, and civil disturbances; or
(h) arises out of or in connection with the
collection of and assessment of taxes; or
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah
National Guard; or
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any
person in any state prison, county, or city jail
or other place of legal confinement; or
(k) arises from any natural condition on state
lands or the result of any activity authorized by
the State Land Board; or
(1) arises out of the activities of providing
emergency medical assistance, fighting fire, handling hazardous materials, or emergency
evacuations.
(2) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived for injury proximately caused or arising out
of a violation of protected fourth amendment rights as
provided in Chapter 16, Title 78 which shall be the
exclusive remedy for injuries to those protected rights.
If §78-16-5 or Subsection 77-35-12(g) or any parts
thereof are held invalid or unconstitutional, this
Subsection (2) shall be void and governmental entities
shall remain immune from suit for violations of fourth
amendment rights.
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Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-30-10.5 (Supp. 1988)
Waiver of immunity for taking private property
without compensation.
(1)

Immunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived for the recovery of compensation from
the governmental entity when the governmental
entity has taken or damaged private property
without just compensation.

(2)

Compensation and damages shall be assessed
according to the requirements of Chapter 34,
Title 78.

Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-27-38 (1987)
Comparative negligence.
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not
alone bar recovery by that person. He may recover
from any defendant or group of defendants whose fault
exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to
any person seeking recovery for any amount in excess
of the proportion of fault attributable to that
defendant.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-27-40 (1987)
Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault—
No contribution.
Subject to §78-27-38, the maximum amount for which
a defendant may be liable to any person seeking
recovery is that percentage or proportion of the
damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of
fault attributed to that defendant. No defendant is
entitled to contribution from any other person.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-27-41 (1987)
Joinder of defendants.
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is
a party to the litigation, may join as parties any
defendants who may have caused or contributed to the
injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the
purpose of having determined their respective proportions of fault.
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